The Effect of Artificial Intelligence Implementation on Total Factor Productivity by Toy, Matthew
Union College 
Union | Digital Works 
Honors Theses Student Work 
3-2021 
The Effect of Artificial Intelligence Implementation on Total Factor 
Productivity 
Matthew Toy 
Union College - Schenectady, NY 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalworks.union.edu/theses 
 Part of the Econometrics Commons, Growth and Development Commons, and the Macroeconomics 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Toy, Matthew, "The Effect of Artificial Intelligence Implementation on Total Factor Productivity" (2021). 
Honors Theses. 2401. 
https://digitalworks.union.edu/theses/2401 
This Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Work at Union | Digital Works. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of Union | Digital Works. For more 
information, please contact digitalworks@union.edu. 





























Submitted in Partial Fulfillment 
of the requirements for 


















TOY, MATTHEW B.   The Effect of Artificial Intelligence Implementation on Total Factor 
Productivity. Department of Economics, March 2021. 
 
Investment in and availability of artificial intelligence has become a central concern for 
most developed economies because of is expected positive impact on an economy. Unlike other 
forms of capital investment, investment in AI may lead to innovative products and processes that 
should increase productivity. However, AI’s overall effect on productivity remains largely 
unknown. Adopting AI replaces labor with capital, which will have a positive effect on labor 
productivity, but overall productivity may remain the same or even decrease. I look at the impact 
of AI implementation on Total Factor Productivity (TFP) in order to assess its effect on the 
economies of the developed world. The data on AI use is from the Stanford Human-Centered 
Artificial Intelligence database, which provides comprehensive measures of a country’s adoption 
of AI. Utilizing the methods set forth by Letta and Tol (2018), I perform a cross-country 
comparison of AI’s effect on TFP. I use OLS to estimate a model of national productivity which 
controls for country specific factors that would drive TFP and is focused on productivity growth 
due to the implementation of AI specifically. My findings suggest that more investment in AI 
implementation does not increase overall productivity. However, I do find that the number of 
startups focused on AI cause an increase in TFP. These findings contribute to the discussion of 
the productivity paradox and support the justification that an implementation lag may play a 
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 Countries throughout the world are rapidly investing in artificial intelligence. Its 
implementation is costly, yet countries large and small desire this new technology and are 
willing to pay the price. However, the effect of artificial intelligence on overall productivity is 
largely unknown. Economists have demonstrated that improving technology in a given nation 
should increase the productivity of that nation as a whole, but artificial intelligence 
implementation itself has not been shown to boost productivity statistics. This productivity 
paradox has been justified with many potential explanations (Brynjolffson, Rock and Syverson, 
2017, Aghion, Jones and Jones, 2017, Syverson, 2017). Ultimately, the most common 
explanation is based on the time lag between when artificial intelligence technology is initially 
implemented and when its effects can actually be seen in the productivity statistics. The research 
throughout this paper reinforces that conclusion and provides evidence supporting the argument.  
 The anticipated effect that artificial intelligence will have on productivity makes 
investment in the new technology attractive. When superior levels of technology are 
implemented throughout a given country, that country is able to produce more output with the 
same levels of labor and capital inputs. Referring back to the basic production function, where 
output is a function of both labor and capital, the impact of technology can be measured by the 
residual difference between the actual output produced and the expected output produced. 
Implementing artificial intelligence would theoretically boost the impact of technology on a 
given country’s output and therefore increase productivity of that country as a whole.  
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 By nature, artificial intelligence is not only used in one industry and its spillover effects 
make its development even more advantageous. Technology that uses artificial intelligence has 
crossed industry verticals and its application has been widespread. As a result, positive 
externalities are created, and the impact of artificial intelligence implementation becomes more 
than simply developing a new machine. From autonomous automobiles to automated surgeries, 
the positive implications of artificial intelligence implementation can be seen in almost any 
industry.   
 In an attempt to capture the effect of artificial intelligence investment specifically, I use 
five independent variables that measure artificial intelligence implementation. These variables 
measure the quality of research focused on artificial intelligence, overall interest in artificial 
intelligence technologies, private investment in artificial intelligence and the number of startups 
focused on artificial intelligence. The data comes from the Stanford Human-Centered Artificial 
Intelligence database and contains 27 countries over four years. For my dependent variable, I use 
total factor productivity. Total factor productivity is commonly used by economists and is an 
indirect measure of the productivity growth due to technology. 
 Previous research suggests that there will be no visible impact on productivity as a result 
of the implementation of artificial intelligence. While this may come as a surprise, economists 
offer different perspectives on the productivity paradox and why it occurs. The most common 
and widely held belief is that there is a productivity paradox because of the time delay after 
implementation. When artificial intelligence implementation occurs, it takes time for its 
widespread use and effects to be seen in the overall productivity statistics. As a result, the 
productivity we might expect to see as a result of the implementation is not there. This effect is 
not unusual and largely resembles the Solow Productivity Paradox of the 1970s and 1980s during 
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which productivity largely remained the same even with rapid increases in information 
technology. My research supports these conclusions and provides further evidence for why the 
time lag argument is the superior reasoning for this paradox.  
 I use multivariable ordinary least squares regression models with both one and two-way 
fixed effects to develop my conclusions. In these models, I use fixed effects for time and country 
to account for potential endogeneity issues. I also use per capita estimates of my variables to deal 
with the large differences in country and economy sizes. I use a logarithmic construction similar 
to Letta and Tol (2018) to achieve reliable results with vastly different sized nations.  
 As expected, my findings are largely consistent with previous research. Research, overall 
interest, and private investment in artificial intelligence have no immediate impact on total factor 
productivity. These findings uphold the productivity paradox theory and are unsurprising.  If 
there was a positive effect of artificial intelligence implementation in the short run, I would see 
an increase of total factor productivity due to private investment and other measures that 
seemingly boost artificial intelligence use in a given country. I believe that the lack of positive 
productivity effects in the short run is true and due the fact that artificial intelligence is largely in 
a research and development state and the technology needs to be put into use. Although many of  
these variables offer no implications for total factor productivity, the variable on the number of 
startups does have a significant positive correlation. This is inconsistent with previous research 
and its impact on total factor productivity is largely unexpected. However, this positive 
coefficient upholds the typical economic belief that artificial intelligence implementation 
increases overall productivity. 
 The statistical significance on the number of startups focused on artificial intelligence 
supports the time argument of the productivity paradox. Unlike other variables I measure, the 
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number of startups in a given nation should have a relatively immediate effect on the economy 
and therefore the productivity. Forming a startup does not occur overnight – there must be some 
investment before the startup is launched. This earlier investment contributes to the impact of 
startups on total factor productivity and may be partly responsible for their fast-acting effect. The 
other variables I use measure investment (of money, research, or education) that is expected to 
have a future impact instead of an immediate one. At this point in time, the majority of artificial 
intelligence investment across countries is in areas that are expected to have less of an immediate 
impact on the overall economy. Since the one variable that represents an immediate application 
of artificial intelligence implementation is positive and significant, it supports the claim that 
there will be a positive effect on productivity from artificial intelligence, it just has not happened 
yet.   
 The main target of my research is to determine the effects of artificial intelligence 
implementation on overall productivity of a given nation. The rest of the paper is organized in 
the following way. The first section contains background and a literature review of the history of 
technology implementation, measuring the impact of artificial intelligence, the productivity 
paradox, and implications on foreign and economic policy. The second section will describe my 
data sources and variables, followed by a description of my economic model and econometric 
relationship. The paper will conclude with a section about my regressions and results and finally 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 This chapter contains relevant background on artificial intelligence implementation as 
well as a literature review. I discuss the potential advantages of the new technology and why 
firms across the world are making investments. Understanding potential uses and implications of 
the artificial intelligence is critical to appreciate the impact of the technology on productivity. I 
provide insight on how the impact of artificial intelligence is measured and discuss the 
productivity paradox that has occurred with artificial intelligence technology. Finally, I include a 
section regarding the future policy implications of artificial intelligence implementation and 
complete this chapter with a brief discussion of the United States and China.   
 
2.1 Artificial Intelligence Implementation 
 Societies have developed and implemented new technologies in order to increase their 
productivity for hundreds of years. From steam engines to computers, technology has been at the 
heart of both scientific improvement and productivity growth. Over the past 150 years, our 
society has been shifting toward automation (Aghion, et al., 2017). Since the industrial 
revolution, we have been automating processes that have now led to the introduction of self-
driving cars and robotic “dogs” used to identify dangerous issues in factories and warzones1. 
Why are we so fascinated with these automation technologies and artificial intelligence? Because 
they are projected to drive the economy forward and change the world through the next industrial 
revolution (Mims, 2018). 
 
1 Tesla, Boston Dynamics 
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 The automation of various procedures using artificial intelligence is advantageous 
because it not only decreases the overall cost of production of existing goods but also makes new 
products possible that could not have been produced without it. Over the past twenty years, 
United States manufacturing employment has declined by millions even as United States 
manufacturing productivity has increased over the same time period2. At a fundamental level, 
artificial intelligence using automation does one thing: replaces existing labor with capital 
investment. This phenomenon motivates firms and businesses to invest in artificial intelligence 
because it not only decreases their labor costs but also increases their productivity. It is seen as a 
win-win for firms and has been recognized by major consulting firms McKinsey and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers as the direction of the future (Cameron, Andrews, and Gillham 2017, 
McKinsey&Company, 2017).  
In more recent years, artificial intelligence, which is widely considered a largely 
technological and engineering phenomenon, has bled into other industries and is becoming 
widely available. In the auto industry, Tesla has launched its beta software and cars are on the 
road with no driver intervention. In 2019, Amazon, a largely automated platform, acquired 
Whole Foods and brought artificial intelligence into the grocery market space. The increasing 
implementation in different industries throughout the world demonstrates the beginning of a 
global shift in adaptation to the newly available technology (Naqvi, 2017). Moreover, the 
definition of “innovative” has changed for companies in ways that they have not expected. For 
example, information technology is at the core of self-proclaimed innovation for companies like 
Pfizer, which works with IBM Health Watson to fuel their immune-oncology research, and the 
 
2 Bureau of Labor Statistics 
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United Postal Service which now develops service-oriented technologies using artificial 
intelligence3.  
 The spillover of artificial intelligence into many different industries reflects the following 
trends. The first is that the increased use of artificial intelligence in both technologically and non-
technologically focused firms is causing industry verticals to become increasingly broken and 
industries themselves to become more interconnected. Industry verticals refer to a group of 
companies which occupy a specialized market. Naqvi (2017) states that, “now, tech-firms can as 
easily build cars as they can make software; they can create trading platforms or develop new 
drugs, or trucks that drive themselves, or drones that fly with little human intervention, or robots 
that can be nurses or guides or housecleaners or companions.” Artificial intelligence has largely 
created and driven a marketplace with technology firms acquiring non-technology firms and vice 
versa. The second trend is that artificial intelligence is not simply a fad but instead a major aspect 
of foundation for the future. In other words, artificial intelligence is here to stay. When new 
technology is created by firms, it is typically marketed to other firms for use. Artificial 
intelligence, however, is not marketed for external use but instead is designed for the designer 
(Naqvi, 2017). As a result, firms in all industries are starting their own artificial intelligence 
programs or acquiring technology firms in order to gain proprietary access to the new platforms 
(Naqvi, 2017). This interconnection and large-scale adoption of firms in all different industries 
has created a shift in technology use that would be extremely difficult to leave behind. Firms 
throughout the world are investing in artificial intelligence and making critical decisions based 
on artificial intelligence use today and well into the future. 
 
3 Pfizer 2016 Financial Report, UPS Pressroom January 2019  
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  The increased investment in artificial intelligence among nations has been referred to as 
a new arms race (Santos & Qin, 2019). In 2017, Vladimir Putin stated, “Whoever becomes the 
leader in this (artificial intelligence) sphere will be the ruler of the world (Horowitz, 2018).” 
While China dominates global artificial intelligence funding, the United States and France have 
both made artificial intelligence investment a priority (Agrawal, et al., 2019). Elon Musk echoed 
the seriousness of artificial intelligence progress in 2017 when he said that growth in artificial 
intelligence technology could spark World War III if it is left unchecked (Horowitz, 2018). This 
sentiment is held by countries throughout the world and has become a driver of global 
investment in artificial intelligence. 
 Although the immense power that artificial intelligence may yield is undeniable, it is 
important to understand that countries adopting it see it as a general-purpose technology 
(Agrawal, et al., 2019). With the adaptation of the new technology across many different 
industries, artificial intelligence allows for different technological advances in a wide variety of 
spaces. The idea of technology as an enabler has a stronger foundation in healthcare and the auto 
industry than it does in weaponization and military strategy (Horowitz, 2018). Across the world 
different countries are exploring potential applications of artificial intelligence in health care 
systems and treatment (Panch, et al., 2018). The impact of these new technologies on the 
healthcare industry, for example, could benefit a country tremendously.  
 Although artificial intelligence is not a military innovation in itself, it could potentially 
enable a number of military innovations and become weaponized. Currently, the technology 
remains largely driven by private, commercial, companies and could easily fuse to different 
countries around the world (Horowitz, 2018). As a result, proprietary knowledge that comes 
through artificial intelligence research and investment is available to all countries, and all 
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militaries, that are willing to invest and are looking to utilize artificial intelligence in their own 
way. It would be naïve to think that heavy investment in artificial intelligence and growth of the 
industry was not tied to national security in some aspect. 
Besides industry spillovers and potential military interest, it has become advantageous for 
countries throughout the world to increase their artificial intelligence development because of the 
substantial impact it has on the economy as a whole. As a result, we have seen growing 
investment in the artificial intelligence space in both advanced and emerging economies (Mou, 
2019). The United States has allowed the private sector to largely control artificial intelligence 
development (Agrawal, et al., 2019). This has led to the commercial driven growth that can be 
seen in private sectors throughout the country. Recently, the United States has begun a more 
“hands on” approach that includes a plan to double federal research and development spending 
on Artificial Intelligence4. In contrast, China’s strong relationship between artificial intelligence 
and Chinese government funding from the beginning places them on track to lead with the new 
technology in several sectors (Mou, 2019). This could be reflective of the differences between a 
capitalist economy (United States) and a socialist economy (China). However, emerging market 
economies as a whole have invested significantly less in artificial intelligence production even 
though they may see greater returns from its implementation than more developed economies 
(Mou, 2019). 
Ultimately, the choice to invest in artificial intelligence results from the analysis of a 
variety of different factors. The technology spillover effects throughout different industries allow 
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private and commercially driven growth. An increase in artificial intelligence growth would 
improve productivity in each industry individually, and as a result the entire economy as a 
whole.  
The anticipated spillovers due to artificial intelligence implementation have high 
expectations. As stated previously, artificial intelligence is considered a general-purpose 
technology. General-purpose technologies generate substantial spillovers to the rest of the 
economy (Hogendorn and Frischmann, 2017). Government policies and regulations should 
enhance these spillovers and may justify greater public subsidy of artificial intelligence research. 
However, in a small case study of artificial intelligence spillovers in Sydney, Australia, findings 
suggest knowledge spillovers are limited and are not in line with its high potential (Cetindamar, 
Lommers, Zhang, 2020).  
With artificial intelligence, the spillover effects that guide economic policy both 
nationally and internationally are largely focused on the diffusion of ideas locally and abroad. In 
an extreme example presented by Goldfarb and Trefler (2018), suppose Canadian researchers 
and scientists controlled all of the knowledge surrounding artificial intelligence and gave it to the 
United States and China for free. Then, the Canadian subsidy would help the world but would 
not give Canada any edge over the competition. Understanding the balance between sharing 
information to improve the worldwide landscape and keeping it locally to give one nation a 
competitive edge is at the crux of policy development surrounding artificial intelligence. 
Goldfarb and Trefler (2018) argue that local, domestic spillover effects have larger positive 
externalities than foreign spillovers. Under growth models presented in their research, they also 
indicate that the artificial intelligence industry may move to the country with the most relaxed 
policies (Goldfarb and Trefler, 2018). The intense privacy policies that are seen in Europe may 
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be a poor market for artificial intelligence development when compared to the United States. For 
countries looking to gain an edge in the artificial intelligence industry, government involvement 
in these areas may boost the overall effect of the new technology.  
 
2.2 Artificial Intelligence, Measurement, and Total Factor Productivity 
 Economists have developed ways to measure the impact of new technology on 
productivity long before artificial intelligence. For years the primary measure of the growth of an 
economy was gross domestic product (GDP). However, measuring economic growth and 
improvement with GDP has been refuted for a variety of reasons and is a flawed measure of 
economic welfare (Jones, et al., 2016). One reason is that GDP growth understates the true gains 
in output per person that has occurred over the last 200 years (Hulten, 2000). This is largely due 
to its lack of adjustment for quality improvement of new goods. Another critique is that GDP 
overstates the true improvement of economic welfare because it does not measure the negative 
spillover externalities associated with increased economic output properly (increasing 
unemployment, depletion of natural resources, etc.) (Hulten, 2000). Since economies can grow 
for reasons such as increased productivity, higher levels of labor, increased capital, etc., 
economists have developed a different approach to separate economic growth due to productivity 
from economic growth due to labor and capital inputs. 
 To understand the effect of a technological change on a given economy, we need to 
revisit the foundation of growth economics. The most basic production function that is presented 
in economic literature is presented below:   
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐹(𝐾𝑡, 𝐿𝑡)       (1)   
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Where Y is output, K is capital services and L is labor services, all at a given time t. Put 
differently, total output is a function of both the output of labor services and capital services 
utilized at a given time period. However, this model of output assumes equal productivity in all 
time periods from labor and capital. In order to account for the changes in productivity that are 
associated with technical progress, we must adjust the equation slightly. 
 To quantitatively assess the contribution of each source of growth to the actual growth of 
output, we need to find a measurement of technical progress. Technical progress in itself is not 
directly observable but is important for explaining the increase in overall standard of living 
(Rossana, 2011). As a result, economists have modeled an equation that provides an indirect 
measurement of the extent of technological progress: 
 
                                                 𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡 ∗ 𝐹(𝐾𝑡, 𝐿𝑡)                   (2) 
Where A is a measure of technical progress, L is labor services provided and K is capital services 
provided in a given time period. By modelling economic growth in this way, we can measure 
technical progress because as A increases, the economy is technically able to produce more 
output from a given resource base (Rossana, 2011). The difference between the projected level of 
output and the actual level of output is the result of the improvement in technical change. This is 
known as the Solow residual which, in other words, is the residual growth rate of output that is 
not explained by the growth in inputs (Hulten, 2000). Today, the variable A is known as Total 
Factor Productivity and is an indirect measurement of productivity growth that is due to technical 
progress. 
 Total Factor Productivity (TFP) has become the standard measurement of productivity 
growth due to the implementation of new technology. However, modern economists argue that 
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TFP may not be the best measure to capture the effects of these technical implementations. 
Carlaw and Lipsey (2003) argue that TFP does not measure technological change at all. Instead, 
they believe that TFP is correctly interpreted as, “contemporary returns that are in excess of the 
normal rate of return on investing in new technologies” (Carlaw and Lipsey, 2003). They provide 
six examples of how TFP fails to correctly measure the excess output that is not captured by a 
country’s inputs. Antonelli and Quatraro (2009) explain that TFP provides a biased measure of 
technological change unless it coincides with the effects at local markets. As a result, TFP 
increases due to technology that are seen in one country may not have the same effect in other 
countries which have different local conditions. Finally, Bar-Shira, Finkelshtain and Simhon 
(2003) find that TFP misrepresents productivity due to technological change because it captures 
other changes in the economy such as savings rate changes or other economic boosters. Because 
TFP captures other factors that contribute to growth, measuring productivity due to technology 
with TFP may create skewed results that could be inaccurate. Additionally, they present a similar 
argument to Antonelli and Quatraro (2009) and suggest that cross-country comparison of 
productivity growth may be biased due to each country’s own characteristics. The impact of 
artificial intelligence on an economy may not be appropriately measured using the TFP model 
presented earlier. 
 
2.3 Artificial Intelligence: A Productivity Paradox 
 The introduction of personal computers in the 1980’s was thought to boost productivity 
across the world (Triplett, 1998). However, in July 1987, economist Robert Solow is famously 
quoted, “We see the new technology everywhere but in the productivity statistics (Hulten, 
2001).” In 1987, it appeared to ring true. Since 1973, average total factor productivity growth 
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rate was 0.2% and the labor productivity growth rate was only 1.1% (Triplett, 1998). This low 
growth rate was coming at a time when new investment in technology was flourishing. 
Businesses were investing heavily in computers and the age of information technology as we 
know it today was beginning; but productivity growth was significantly lower than it was in 
years past. To put it in perspective, the growth rate from 1948 to 1973 was 1.9% for total factor 
productivity and 2.9% for labor productivity (Triplett, 1998). How could the decline in 
productivity growth occur after the introduction of personal computers? The new technology that 
would eventually change the world was resulting in significantly lower productivity growth. A 
few explanations followed suggesting productivity measurement issues, or the effects of the new 
technology were not modeled correctly, but ultimately maybe computers just were not as 
productive as people thought. Today, we have seen the large-scale effect of computers and their 
implementation throughout the world. It is safe to say that yes, they do improve our well-being 
and our productivity. Also, it is worth noting that the sharp rise in oil prices caused by OPEC 
exerting its cartel power was the main reason for the decrease in TFP growth during the 1980s; it 
was not computers that caused the fall. 
 Brynjolfsson, Rock and Syverson (2017) believe that the same productivity paradox that 
was witnessed before is occurring again, but this time with artificial intelligence implementation. 
That is, the overall productivity growth that we expect to see as a result of artificial intelligence 
investment may not actually be there, or worse, even result in a productivity decline. Although 
systems using artificial intelligence can surpass human capabilities, “measured productivity 
growth has declined by half over the past decade, and real income has stagnated since the late 
1990s for a majority of Americans” (Brynjolfsson, et al., 2017). Again, we must ask how this is 
possible. The existing literature focuses on three primary reasons.  
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 The first is an issue regarding “false hopes.” This explanation suggests that the expected 
productivity growth and excitement surrounding artificial intelligence is misplaced.  Even though 
some sectors may show productivity growth with artificial intelligence implementation, it may 
not be widespread throughout the different industries and therefore may not affect aggregate 
productivity growth (Brynjolffson, et al., 2017). Aghion, Jones and Jones (2017) attempt to find 
the linkages between artificial intelligence and economic growth, yet their conclusions do not 
offer any concrete explanation for this paradox (Aghion, et al., 2017). It is entirely possible that 
artificial intelligence is not as productive as we think, and the decline in productivity statistics 
supports this hypothesis. 
 The second, more widely accepted, explanation for the paradox is that there is a 
measurement problem. Many economists believe that a traditional TFP calculation that has been 
done in the past does not offer the best measurement of productivity growth due to artificial 
intelligence implementation. This idea is supported by many economists and they have attempted 
to develop new ways to measure not only the effect artificial intelligence implementation on TFP 
but also the effect of new technologies in general. Antonelli and Quatraro (2010) attempt to 
create a new methodology that untangles the effect of technology bias on the standard change of 
the aggregate production function. Also, Seamans and Raj (2018) suggest that the current data is 
not enough, and it is necessary to acquire data from individual firms. Fox (2012) argues that the 
aggregation of firm productivity may yield inaccurate results of aggregate productivity due to the 
current method used. Combined with research mentioned previously by Carlaw and Lipsey 
(2003) and Bar Shira, et al (2003), it can be concluded that economists are searching for an 
improved measure of TFP and the effect of technology on aggregate productivity in general.  
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 Brynjolfsson, Rock and Syverson (2017) present the mismeasurement explanation of the 
paradox in a different light. They claim that the productivity benefits of new technology have 
been enjoyed but not accurately measured. More specifically, new technologies such as 
smartphones, tablets, and online social networks are relatively cheap and require minimal cost. 
However, consumers spend a lot of time using these new technologies which suggests that they 
receive substantial utility even if they account for a very small share of GDP (Brynjolfsson, et 
al., 2017). With all of these arguments for a measurement explanation, it is important to note that 
Syverson (2017) and Byrne, Fernald and Reinsdorf (2016) find that mismeasurement may not be 
the main cause, if any cause at all, of the productivity paradox. While many of the products today 
may be offering benefits that are not recorded properly in GDP, the same could be said about 
technology implementation in any time period (Brynjolfsson, et al., 2017).  
 The third economic justification for why we may see this productivity paradox with 
artificial intelligence is that we have not given it enough time. Implementation and restructuring 
lags of new components and improvements in technology may be having a substantial effect. 
The diffusion of new technology across industries has presented an opportunity for productivity 
growth that we have not seen before, but at the same time have not given enough time to fully 
capture the effects. Unlike the previous two explanations, the argument that there has not been 
enough time for the full effects of artificial intelligence to come to fruition is in line with the 
current TFP results. In other words, this explanation does not attempt to justify the unexpected 
impact of artificial intelligence on aggregate productivity growth by neither claiming that 
investors and creators were incorrect, nor the measurements are inaccurate. This justification 
suggests that there are reasons to be excited about the future while taking into account the low 
productivity growth that we have seen in recent years (Brynjolfsson, et al., 2017). 
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 The gap between implementation and productivity growth that is seen in artificial 
intelligence is consistent with the Solow productivity paradox surrounding computers. It took a 
substantial amount of time for the widespread implementation of computers to have a positive 
effect on productivity growth. Triplett (1998) explains that one of the most common 
justifications for the Solow productivity paradox is a time lag. In his paper, he analyzes the 
argument, “you don’t see computers in the productivity statistics yet, but wait a bit and you will” 
(Triplett, 1998). Ultimately this is fundamentally the same justification presented by 
Brynjolffson, Rock, and Syverson (2017).  
 The third explanation suggests that it takes a considerable amount of time for the effects 
of artificial intelligence on productivity to be captured. The amount of time that it takes for the 
technology to reach its full potential and start to make a serious impact is longer than is expected. 
This occurs for two primary reasons. The first reason is that it takes a significant amount of time 
to build enough of the new technology that it will affect the aggregate productivity of a nation. In 
order to make an impact on aggregate productivity, the diffusion of the technology throughout 
the nation must be widespread and enormous. The second is that the productivity increase may 
not be captured until investment in complimentary technology takes place on a large scale 
(Brynjolfsson, et al., 2017). For example, consider the computer productivity paradox that 
occurred in the late 1900s. The widespread usage of computer networks provided a substantial 
positive impact on productivity statistics (Atrostic & Nguyen, 2005). Van Ark (2016) supports 
this idea and argues that the new digital economy is still in its “installation phase” and 
productivity effects may only occur once it has been deployed on a much larger scale.  
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2.4 Cross-Country Comparison Issues with Artificial Intelligence 
 The effects of artificial intelligence implementation may be different depending on the 
size of a country’s economy. Nations which invest large quantities of capital on artificial 
intelligence should yield higher levels of artificial intelligence implementation. However, 
measurement issues occur in cross-country comparison because smaller countries may have 
lower levels of total investment yet have equal or even greater levels of artificial intelligence 
adoption when compared to their larger counterparts. Therefore, it is important to account for the 
different sized economies in the analysis of artificial intelligence implementation.  
 Economists have devoted a substantial amount of effort to evaluating aggregate 
productivity in different countries since 1975 (Lafuente, et al., 2019). Since every country is 
different, and every country has their own economic policies, TFP discrepancies must be 
evaluated based on each individual country. As a result, the cross-country comparison becomes 
more difficult.  However, economists have utilized different methods to overcome the cross-
country analysis issues. 
 Albarran, Inklaar, and Woltjer (2019) find an issue with the assumption of homogeneity 
that is made in aggregate cross-country comparison. Their research focuses on the idea that 
different types of capital have different marginal products and cannot be assumed as 
homogenous. More specifically, they suggest that wealthier nations acquire capital with a higher 
marginal product than nations with less wealth. Put differently, wealthier nations are more likely 
to invest in artificial intelligence than developing nations and therefore spending on artificial 
intelligence is not random. They overcome this issue by creating a slightly adjusted measurement 
of TFP from the Penn World Tables that can account for more cross-country variation in income 
levels.  
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 Eberhardt and Teal (2010) run into a similar issue with cross-country comparison. 
Specifically, when comparing aggregate productivity averages across countries, TFP does not 
account for the heterogeneity that exists between them. Once again, treating all of the countries 
in the same way is does not appropriately account for their individual differences. Eberhardt and 
Teal (2010) attempt to take into account parameter differences among countries and are able to 
obtain a more accurate measure of technology’s effect on productivity.  
 Ultimately, potential issues may arise because countries are not randomly assigned to 
large investment in artificial intelligence. To illustrate this, assume a country would normally 
have productivity growth of 2%. That country chooses to invest heavily in artificial intelligence 
and only has 1% productivity growth in the next year. We would conclude that the investment in 
artificial intelligence was presumably unwise, but we can only draw that conclusion if we are 
certain that the country would otherwise have been on the same growth track as others. This last 
assumption cannot be made because it is not random which countries invest heavily in artificial 
intelligence. Instead, we have to determine an appropriate measurement for cross-country 
comparison that provides reliable results. The RTFPNA variable is a modified version of TFP that 
is used by Letta and Tol (2018). Their findings suggest that this RTFPNA variable is more reliable 
than typical TFP and can be used in cross-country comparison.  
 My research differs from previous studies for a number of reasons. Albarran, Inklaar, and 
Woltjer (2019) look at the cross-country productivity comparisons with different compositions of 
capital. Although my research utilizes a similar methodology, I focus primarily on artificial 
intelligence whereas Albarran, Inklaar, and Woltjer (2019) examine capital stock estimates. 
Eberhardt and Teal (2010) focus on the manufacturing industry in their cross-country TFP 
comparisons instead of country adoption of new technologies as a whole. My subject matter is 
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closest to the paper by Brynjolfsson, Rock, and Syverson (2017), but instead of focusing on the 
productivity paradox my research is concerned with the short-term effects of artificial 
intelligence on TFP for a given country. 
 
2.5 Further Implications of Artificial Intelligence Investment on Foreign and Economic 
Policy 
 Economic literature has shown that policy will shape how artificial intelligence impacts 
society (Agrawal, et al., 2019). Revisiting the idea of artificial intelligence as a general-purpose 
technology, policy decisions will have large scale implications for artificial intelligence impact 
across a variety of different industries. Optimists believe that artificial intelligence will change 
the world for the better, and the positive impacts of the implementation of new technologies 
greatly outweigh any potential negative spillover effects. Pessimistic viewers believe that 
artificial intelligence could lead to a handful of companies dominating society with increased 
inequality and few jobs left for human workers. These contrasting opinions both have weight, 
and policy appears to be both the connection and the guide for the path artificial intelligence will 
take. 
 The two dominant investors in the artificial intelligence space are the United States and 
China. While the United States has taken a largely “hands off” approach to artificial intelligence 
development, directing most of the development to private companies, China has made it a 
priority and even provided government funding for the new technology (Agrawal, et al., 2019). 
These two different approaches may have alternative effects on the success of artificial 
intelligence technology. Santos and Qin (2019) claim that China dominates global artificial 
intelligence funding and look like they will lead the artificial intelligence space in several areas. 
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This is largely due to the strong relationship between artificial intelligence development and the 
Chinese government.  
 The protection of Chinese firms by the Chinese government has made it difficult for 
major United States firms such as Amazon and Google to enter Chinese markets (Goldfarb & 
Trefler, 2018). This protection combined with limited intellectual property laws have allowed 
Chinese companies such as Alibaba, Tencent, and Huawei to dominate Chinese markets and 
surge to the forefront of global artificial intelligence use and development. Moreover, in 2017, 
the United States participated in fewer artificial intelligence conferences than they did in 2012 
while China participated in 13% more (Goldfarb & Trefler, 2018). This trend is occurring when 
it is said that data and information are the new oil, whoever handles the data handles the 
emerging future of the global economy (Bonsu, 2020). The “hands off” approach that is taken by 
the United States may have a negative impact on their position in the global economy if Chinese 
artificial intelligence investment and growth continues to dominate the international sphere.  
 The possible spillover effects between countries are also affected by their policies. If 
China was more open about its technology, there would be opportunities for further innovation 
throughout the world and more widespread adoption. Although this may initially have a negative 
effect for the Chinese Communist Party as others use their technology to move their own 
countries forward, it may be advantageous in the long run. Today, Chinese artificial intelligence 
companies lack household recognition outside of China (Goldfarb and Trefler, 2018). By 
creating more open communication and expanding technological innovation beyond its borders, 
China may be able to benefit its own companies while boosting the artificial intelligence 
adoption in other countries throughout the world.  
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 Agrawal, Gans and Goldfarb (2019) suggest that there are two main aspects of policy 
involving artificial intelligence implementation. The first is intellectual property policy. 
Intellectual property policy will influence the diffusion of artificial intelligence in different 
industries through privacy, trade, and liability. Data privacy has become a major concern for 
many people throughout both the United States and the world. Artificial intelligence, especially 
machine learning, is a largely data driven entity. Because of the need for large amounts of data, 
policy surrounding data privacy is brought into question. Although data privacy is important, 
government-mandated privacy regulation may lead to slower technology adoption and less 
innovation (Goldfarb & Tucker, 2011). Policy decisions regarding data privacy and 
corresponding regulations will have an impact on the artificial intelligence diffusion throughout 
an economy which will in turn affect aggregate productivity.  
 Intellectual property policy will have a substantial effect on global trade and the 
international impact of artificial intelligence. Privacy policies vary across countries. For 
example, Chinese data privacy policies are vastly different from those in the United States. As a 
result, data available to Chinese artificial intelligence researchers and producers may not be 
available to Americans (Goldfarb & Trefler, 2018). Therefore, the artificial intelligence 
improvements that occur in one country may not be possible in another. In future trade 
agreements, it is possible that artificial intelligence will spark a conversation regarding 
international privacy standards (Agrawal, et al., 2019). These trade policy decisions could 
change the effect of artificial intelligence throughout the world.  
 The effect of liability policies on artificial intelligence diffusion and implementation may 
be less obvious than privacy and trade. To illustrate this concept, consider a machine learning 
algorithm that is used to determine rates on auto insurance. This is a biased algorithm that gives 
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more weight to credit score than driving history, and as a result, wealthy, dangerous drivers are 
given lower rates than poor, safe drivers (O’Neil, 2016). When this method of auto insurance 
calculation is uncovered and deemed unfair, who takes the blame? The insurance company that 
is using it, or the creators of the machine learning algorithm? Another example is the self-driving 
technology of automobiles. Tesla has launched completely autonomous self-driving cars that are 
being tested throughout the United States. If an autonomous Tesla kills someone crossing the 
street, who is blamed? The human “driver” or the Tesla company itself? These questions need to 
be answered with concrete liability policy in order for large scale diffusion to continue. Investors 
may be worried about these liability implications and could be deterred from the investment into 
artificial intelligence (Agrawal, et al., 2019). Decreased investment in artificial intelligence may 
slow its overall adoption in countries throughout the world. 
 The second main aspect of policy presented by Agrawal, Gans and Goldfarb (2019) are 
labor and antitrust policies. Labor and antitrust policies are important for the consequences of 
artificial intelligence in employment, inequality, and competition. Employment is one of the 
primary concerns when it comes to artificial intelligence implementation. When replacing labor 
with capital, specifically artificial intelligence, economies are reducing the number of jobs 
available to their labor force. As a result, many economists and government officials are 
concerned with a potential rising unemployment rate as a result of increased artificial 
intelligence implementation. However, artificial intelligence optimists believe that the new 
technology may substitute existing jobs and initially increase unemployment, before creating 
new jobs that were previously non-existent and offer opportunities for increased labor 
productivity. In other words, increasing technological efficiency should lead to greater labor 
demand in the long run. With this argument, nations should not be deterred from investment in 
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artificial intelligence technology because they will increase their labor demand and decrease their 
unemployment. Qiulin, Duo and Yi (2019) find that current artificial intelligence development 
has supplemental substitution properties rather than crowding-out substitution properties. In 
other words, the positive productivity and labor effects that occur because of artificial 
intelligence implementation are greater than the initial employment loss. Economists warn that 
the long run positive effects on employment due to artificial intelligence may be a long way 
down the road, which is important for policy makers to keep in mind (Agrawal, et al., 2019). 
 The inequality aspect of policy making is based largely on the implementation of high-
level technology in general. Utilizing artificial intelligence greatly benefits those who know how 
to use it. This implies that educated and already wealthy individuals will receive the greatest 
returns from large scale artificial intelligence implementation. This could increase the wealth gap 
and emphasize the disparity between an economy’s wealthy and poor populations. Moreover, the 
jobs that will be replaced by artificial intelligence first will be low-income positions which 
require manual labor. Not only will the implementation of artificial intelligence benefit the 
educated and wealthy, but it may also force poor, uneducated members of the economy out of 
work and create further inequality. 
 Finally, policy regarding competition in artificial intelligence investment is critical to 
avoid the development of monopolies and few companies dominating society (Agrawal, et al., 
2019). Leading artificial intelligence companies dominate the market for this new technology 
and have recently been under scrutiny for their immense revenues and market control. In the 
United States, companies such as Google, Amazon, Apple and Facebook have all been under 
scrutiny for their monopolistic characteristics and the markets they dominate. The policy 
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decisions made could have substantial impacts on future artificial intelligence implementation 
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CHAPTER 3 
DATA SOURCES AND DESCRIPTION 
 
 In this section, I describe my data sources and how I create my dataset. Next, I provide 
information on my independent variables used to capture the level of artificial intelligence 
implementation in a given country. Finally, I discuss my dependent variable, RTFPNA, and its 
construction before presenting the summary statistics. 
 
3.1 Data Sources 
 In my research I attempt to measure the effect of artificial intelligence implementation on 
total factor productivity. The data I observe for this analysis come from two primary sources: the 
Stanford Human-centered Artificial Intelligence (HAI) database and the latest edition of the Penn 
World Tables (PWT). The Stanford HAI data was used to develop the 2019 Stanford HAI index 
report, which includes relevant data on artificial intelligence implementation from 27 different 
countries. The research is broken up into eight sections in an attempt to gauge all relevant 
aspects of artificial intelligence implementation. The eight sections are research and 
development, conferences, technical performance, economy, education, autonomous systems, 
public perception, and societal considerations. The Stanford HAI group uses these data to 
develop an index report and score for each individual country in the dataset (HAI Index Report, 
2019). The data has been gathered from a variety of databases and vetted by over 150 academic 
and industry experts. The mission of the Stanford HAI program is to, “provide unbiased, 
rigorous, and comprehensive data for policymakers, researchers, journalists, executives, and the 
general public to develop a deeper understanding of the complex field of artificial intelligence” 
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(HAI Index Report, 2019). The Stanford HAI has made the data they use to build their own 
artificial intelligence index public and available for download.  
  Data on productivity comes from the Penn World Tables. The latest edition of the Penn 
World Tables was released on January 28th, 2021 and includes a wide range of macroeconomic 
variables for many different countries. The Penn World Tables has been a highly regarded 
database for major macroeconomic variables for over 40 years and offers information on 183 
countries between 1950 and 2019 (Feenstra, et al., 2018). Run by the University of Groningen, 
these data are consistently updated and offer an accurate measure of country macroeconomic 
statistics. The data published by the University of Groningen Economic Growth Centre is 
publicly available for download.  
The dataset I am using is panel data. It is made up of 27 countries from 2015-2018 
yielding four years’ worth of data and 108 data points. Ultimately, I end up with 26 countries 
over four years, and 104 total data points, due to incomplete data from the United Arab Emirates. 
These countries were selected by the Stanford HAI team because they offer a unique cross-
section of countries in regions across the world. The countries also represent different income 
levels from high income to lower middle income, although most countries included are high 
income countries. The technology itself is expensive and as a result is more easily adopted by 
high income countries. The Stanford HAI group developed its first HAI index report in 2017 and 
used data dating back to 2015. The data from the Penn World Tables is also available for this 
time period. The Penn World Tables has more of both countries and years, but I am limited to the 
countries and years included in the Stanford HAI dataset.  
 The dataset I use for my regressions contains elements of both aforementioned data 
sources. In order to determine the impact of artificial intelligence implementation on TFP, I 
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obtain variables that are related to artificial intelligence from the Stanford HAI dataset and TFP 
from the Penn World Tables. When combining these two datasets, I create cross-sectional data 
on both productivity and artificial intelligence implementation. The variables described below 
are available for each country and year in my dataset and combine into a complete dataset with 
no missing values. 
 
3.2 Independent Variables 
 The independent variables on artificial intelligence I use in my regressions are captured 
by the Stanford HAI database. Since there is no single clear variable to represent artificial 
intelligence implementation, I use the number of artificial intelligence journal citations, number 
of artificial intelligence conference citations, share of enrollment in artificial intelligence focused 
courses, artificial intelligence private investment, and the number of start-ups focused on 
artificial intelligence. Together, these variables offer a comprehensive outlook on a country’s 
overall artificial intelligence implementation. The rest of this chapter will contain individual 
variable descriptions for each of my independent and dependent variables.  
 The first independent variable I use to capture artificial intelligence implementation is the 
number of journal paper citations. This independent variable estimates the number of times a 
paper published in an academic journal was cited. For example, the United States had 48,175 
papers that were published by an American academic journal cited by other authors in 2018. I 
chose this variable instead of the total number of journal papers published because I wanted to 
ensure that I was measuring the quality of work instead of just the quantity. With this variable, I 
am able to account for the quality of papers, and therefore research, published in academic 
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journals for each given country. This falls under the Research and Development section of the 
Stanford HAI Index and was obtained by Stanford from the Microsoft Academic Graph.  
 The second independent variable used in my regressions is the number of conference 
citations. By estimating the quality of conference publications, this variable helps capture the 
value of attending artificial intelligence conferences. Artificial intelligence focused conferences 
are held around the world and it is believed that countries who attend more conferences and 
create higher quality work will move further along in artificial intelligence implementation.  The 
United States has the highest number of conference citations with 42,160 citations in 2018. 
Conferences is its own section under the Stanford HAI which emphasizes its importance in 
overall artificial intelligence development. This variable was also obtained by Stanford from the 
Microsoft Academic Graph.  
 The third independent variable I use to capture artificial intelligence implementation is 
the enrollment share. The enrollment share variable was collected by Stanford from Coursera and 
estimates the fraction of a country’s enrollments that are in courses teaching Artificial 
Intelligence and related skills in order to gauge the relative interest in artificial intelligence 
content across the world. Measured over time, this variable shows enrollment trends and where 
the emphasis on artificial intelligence is increasing or decreasing. The enrollment share variable 
is categorized under the Economy section of the Stanford HAI database because it evaluates the 
interest in gaining skills in artificial intelligence. France has the highest enrollment share among 
the 27 countries measured in my dataset. 
 The fourth independent variable, which also falls under the economy section of the 
Stanford HAI dataset, is the total private investment in artificial intelligence. This variable 
measures the total amount of private investment funding received for artificial intelligence 
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focused startups in United States dollars. Capturing the amount of private investment in artificial 
intelligence is valuable for a number of reasons. The first reason is that it offers a strong 
indicator of the interest of a country in artificial intelligence implementation. Theoretically, 
higher private investment in artificial intelligence should be associated with an increase in 
overall artificial intelligence use and implementation because increased investment typically 
means increased research and production. However, measuring private investment in artificial 
intelligence also adds another level of comparison between countries. While some countries, like 
the United States, leave much of their artificial intelligence development and implementation to 
the private sector, other countries, like China, heavily subsidize companies focused on artificial 
intelligence implementation and therefore contribute less money from private investment. The 
United States has the highest value for this variable with over $18.7 billion in private investment 
in 2018. Stanford reports obtaining the measures for this variable from Crunchbase, CapIQ and 
Quid. 
 The fifth independent variable I use in my regression is the number of startups focused on 
artificial intelligence. This variable measures the total number of artificial intelligence companies 
founded in a given country. With more companies focused on artificial intelligence there should 
be more research, development, and production and therefore higher levels of overall artificial 
intelligence implementation. Similar to total artificial intelligence private investment, this 
variable also has political implications. The ease of starting a business depends on the country. 
Therefore, if there is a positive and significant correlation with TFP, it would show that countries 
which have more new technology startups are more productive. The United States has the 
highest number of artificial intelligence startups with 1,480 companies in 2018. In per capita 
terms, Israel is the highest in 2018. These values also come from Crunchbase, CapIQ, and Quid.  
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 The Stanford HAI data also includes per capita measures for each of the above 
independent variables. Because the countries I am comparing can be vastly different sizes, it will 
be important to use per capita variables to account for the size difference during comparison. The 
per capita variables are all calculated with the population in millions as the denominator.  
 
3.3 RTFPNA and its Construction 
 My dependent variable is RTFPNA and comes from the Penn World Tables (PWT) 
version 10.0. RTFPNA stands for Real Total Factor Productivity from National Accounts Data. 
Specifically, this is a measure of TFP at constant national prices. It is a country-specific index of 
TFP with a benchmark year of 2017 and is used to measure within-country productivity growth 
over time (Letta & Tol, 2018). When using the logarithmic transformation of my RTFPNA 
variable, the benchmark value for all countries is zero. RTFPNA is a calculated variable and is not 
observable. Therefore, it is possible that there is ambiguity in the root cause of a rise or fall in 
TFP.  
 RTFPNA is calculated slightly differently than typical TFP. Instead of allowing TFP to 
capture the entire residual growth rate of output that is not explained by the growth of inputs, the 
RTFPNA variable adjusts for the effect of inflation which in turn captures broader changes to the 
economy as well. By keeping prices constant throughout measurement, RTFPNA is able to 
measure within-country productivity growth over time while removing outside influences that 
may have previously been included in the TFP calculation. As a result, the productivity increase 
that is represented by the RTFPNA variable should be less biased and more accurate when 
evaluating the effects of technical progress. The following explanation of RTFPNA is based on 
the appendix from the paper Weather, Climate, and Total Factor Productivity by Letta and Tol. 
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They explain the RTFPNA calculation from edition 8.1 of the Penn world Tables. Version 10.0 
has updated data and uses 2017 as the benchmark year, but otherwise measures these values in 
the same way.  
 
Construction of the RTFPNA variable  
 RTFPNA is calculated using the real GDP growth rate as well as the growth rates of 
capital stock and the labor force (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer, 2013). The start of this 
calculation comes from the general Cobb-Douglas production function: 
 
𝑌 = 𝐴 ∗ 𝑓(𝐾, 𝐿) = 𝐴 ∗ 𝐾𝛼(𝐸 ∗ ℎ𝑐)1−        (3) 
 
Where Y is output, K is capital and L is labor. L is defined by a product of the number of workers 
in the economy, E, times their average human-capital hc. Capital is raised to the power of  and 
labor input is raised to the power of 1-.  is the output elasticity of capital and 1- is the output 
elasticity of labor. Since the exponents in the Cobb-Douglas function add up to one, we assume 
constant returns to scale. A second-order approximation to the production function f is 
represented by the Tӧrnqvist quantity index of factor inputs 𝑄𝑇, which can be used to compare 
inputs between t-1 and t for a given country as follows (Letta and Tol, 2018). Since we know 
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In the above equation, Qt represents the total inputs for a given country, ln
𝐾𝑡
𝐾𝑡−1
 represents the 
percent growth in labor inputs from time t-1 to time t, and ln
𝐿𝑡
𝐿𝑡−1
 represents the percent growth in 
capital inputs from time t-1 to time t. This equation is necessary because even though we have 
levels of  from our previous equation,  varies among countries and may change over time.  As 
a result, we add a time subscript and weigh K by  and L by 1-. In the above equation, this 
weighting is performed by taking the average weight of labor and capital growth between t-1 and 
t. From equation (4), we can learn how much inputs grew in a given year. 
 To implement equation (4), the assumption that output elasticity of capital is 
approximated by the country’s share of GDP is not earned by labor is made (Letta and Tol, 
2018). Finally, growth in productivity over time (TFP) is given by: 
𝑅𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑡,𝑡−1





𝑇⁄      (5) 
Where RGDPNA stands for real GDP at constant national prices. The right-hand side of this 
equation calculates how much GDP increases/decreases with a country’s total inputs in a given 
year. RTFPNA, therefore, is a measure of how much productivity grows over time. If outputs 
grow faster than inputs, than productivity increases and RTFPNA is greater than one. If 
productivity remains the same, RTFPNA will be equal to one. If productivity declines, then 
RTFPNA will be less than one.  
 Table 1 contains summary statistics for all variables I use in my regression in original 
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3.4 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 
 count mean sd min max 
numjournalcitations 108 15130.76 27689.25 358 165576 
numconfcitations 108 11857.96 28889.42 55 200790 
enrollshare 108 .0599758 .0327491 .0090137 .1323639 
aiprivateinvest 108 8.12e+08 2.77e+09 177496 1.87e+10 
numstartups 108 77.33333 216.257 2 1480 
numjournalcitationspc 
 
108 .000368 .0004518 4.82e-06 0.0027993 
numconfcitationspc 108 .0002592 .0003434 9.52e-07 .0021583 
enrollshare 108 .0599758 .0327491 .0090137 .1323639 
aiprivateinvestpc 108 8.815697 18.51008 .0083655 117.5569 
numstartupspc 108 1.65e-06 2.26e-06 9.70e-09 .0000147 
rtfpna 104 1.009796 .0515582 .865912 1.212405 
 
Total Factor Productivity is a calculated measure for each country and does not need to be 
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CHAPTER 4 
ECONOMIC MODEL AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 In this chapter I present the economic model and econometric relationship I intend to use 
for my regressions. I explain the need for including both per capita and logarithmic models in my 
analysis and provide justification for utilizing fixed effects. Finally, I discuss potential issues of 
endogeneity and how I plan to overcome their negative impact. 
 
4.1 Economic Model  
 The economic model I create follows the methodology set forth by Letta and Tol (2018). 
In their paper, they utilize RTFPNA as the dependent variable and create a regression model. I 
will use an OLS regression model with both country and time fixed effects in order ensure the 
robustness of my conclusions. The literature has suggested that there will be a productivity 
paradox, i.e., the anticipated positive effects of artificial intelligence implementation will not be 
seen in the productivity statistics. Although a productivity paradox is expected, my results may 
differ because of the unique aspects of artificial intelligence implementation captured by my 
dataset and increasing technology spillover effects.  
Implementing artificial intelligence technology should increase the overall productivity 
of countries across the world because of the effects of new technology on productivity. Aghion, 
Jones, and Jones (2017) present the production function below: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡 ∗ 𝐾𝑡
𝛼𝐿𝑡
1−𝛼        (6) 
Where Y is output, A is technology, K is capital, and L is labor. Essentially, this 
production function shows that as technology improves (A increases), output should increase 
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even with existing labor and capital inputs. Since artificial intelligence implementation is seen as 
a technological improvement, implementing more artificial intelligence should yield higher 
levels of productivity. Capturing the impact of technological growth is more complicated than 
the equation above, and as a result total factor productivity was created to measure technical 
progress in a given country. A modified version of TFP is the dependent variable in my 
economic model.  
One issue that may arise with the implementation of artificial intelligence is the dual 
impact that it has on both technology and capital. When artificial intelligence implementation 
occurs, part of the effects of the new technology will be absorbed by the increased capital that is 
developed as a result. However, this increase in capital is different from building more factories 
or roads and artificial intelligence will increase technology more than other forms of capital 
investment. An increase in capital that is related to technology should drive up productivity and 
will mostly be captured by my TFP variable even if there is some spillover into the capital 
portion of the production function.  
I use total factor productivity as my dependent variable instead of GDP or other growth 
measures because it isolates the effect of technology on overall growth. When a nation is 
attempting to improve its productivity in the long term, it is important to measure their 
investment using TFP instead of their overall growth numbers. If a country is spending large 
amounts of money on building coal-burning factors and infrastructure, their overall 
unemployment numbers decrease and their output increases, leading GDP and other growth 
indicators to rise. However, investment in these areas do not increase productivity at the same 
level as technological investment in the long term. Because an increase in capital changes overall 
output but does not affect TFP, using TFP as the dependent variable in my model captures the 
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way in which artificial intelligence investment changes technology, and not the way that it 
changes output by increasing capital in the economy. Therefore, using TFP to measure 
productivity growth due to artificial intelligence implementation is appropriate and will 
effectively estimate productivity growth.  
The standard economic model for my regression is shown below: 
 
𝑇𝐹𝑃 = 𝛽1𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽3𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒
+ 𝛽4𝑎𝑖𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑠 + 𝜀  
 
 Estimation by least squares requires assuming that the independent variables are 
exogenous. An increase in artificial intelligence implementation, i.e. the right hand side of my 
equation, should increase TFP for the reasons mentioned above. However, there is reason for 
some concern about endogeneity in my right-hand side variables. When estimating TFP I have 
attempted to include all relevant independent variables available. Because artificial intelligence 
implementation is difficult to measure, it is naïve to think that none of the variables included in 
my regression have any correlation with the error term. That is, an increase in the error term, 
meaning an increase in something not included in my regression affecting total factor 
productivity, may be correlated with the number of journal citations, etc. Also, the error term in 
this case is not observable which makes it challenging to know whether my independent 
variables are endogenous or exogenous. Although endogeneity is a potential concern, I continue 
with my research and include one and two-way fixed effects models in an attempt to absorb the 
potential endogeneity. The fixed effects absorb the endogeneity that comes from different 
countries making different types of investments. 
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 Utilizing fixed effects models are one way to deal with endogeneity issues. Fixed effects 
models capture the differences in the dependent variable associated with each unit and/or time 
period (Bailey, 2017). Fixed effects also allow different units to have different baseline levels of 
my TFP variable. I run a one-way fixed effects models for time, attempting to control for the 
variation that occurs in TFP growth in different years.  As a result of the fixed effects, a different 
value of  will be used for each year. The economic model with one-way fixed effects is below.  
 
𝑇𝐹𝑃 = 𝛽1𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽3𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒
+ 𝛽4𝑎𝑖𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑠 + 𝛼𝑖𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀  
  
 I also create two-way fixed effects models for both year and country as well as year and 
region. Using two-way fixed effects accounts for the variation in both time and location (either 
country or region) in an attempt to further eliminate endogeneity that may occur with my 
independent variables. While including fixed effects for country, I am eliminating potential 
endogeneity by comparing within countries and seeing if they have higher TFP in years with 
higher levels of artificial intelligence implementation. Including fixed effects for region, like 
country, allows me to account for potential bias that may occur within regions that are correlated 
with an independent variable. When using only region fixed effects, I am comparing countries to 
one another within a region but not across regions. This eliminates omitted variable bias that 
could come from comparing Germany to Japan, but not the bias that could come from comparing 
Germany to France. Fixed effects models often eliminate some significance in regressions 
because when we remove fixed effects from the error term, they can no longer be a source for the 
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correlation with either the independent or dependent variables. I can use two-way fixed effects 
because I have panel data. The two-way fixed effects models are below. 
 
𝑇𝐹𝑃 = 𝛽1𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽3𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒
+ 𝛽4𝑎𝑖𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑠 + 𝛼𝑖𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝛼𝑗𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜀 
 
𝑇𝐹𝑃 = 𝛽1𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽3𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒
+ 𝛽4𝑎𝑖𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑠 + 𝛼𝑖𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝛼𝑗𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝜀 
 
 In addition to the fixed effects approach I use to eliminate potential endogeneity issues; I 
also have a comparison issue between the size of different countries. The United States, for 
example, had a population of approximately 327 million in 2018. This is much larger than Israel, 
which had a population of approximately 8.4 million at the same time. The size difference 
contributes largely to the number of journal and conference citations, number of startups, and 
overall artificial intelligence investment. This size difference makes these two countries almost 
impossible to compare and I therefore need to utilize per capita values of each variable. A per 
capita approach makes it possible to see if artificial intelligence implementation is actually 
assisting in productivity growth instead of the size and wealth of a given country causing the 
increase.  
 Letta and Tol (2018) use an alternative approach when making cross-country 
comparisons. Instead of using per capita estimations, they use a logarithmic construction in 
which a logarithmic transformation is used on the dependent variable and the independent 
variables remain linear. I follow this approach for my dependent variable but also use a 
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logarithmic transformation on my independent variables for ease of comparison and 
interpretation. This model allows me to estimate the percent change in TFP that is associated 
with a percent change in any one of my independent variables. Because the regression measures 
the percent change in my dependent variable that is associated with the percent change in my 
independent variable, the log-log construction is useful in comparing countries of different sizes. 
The logarithmic construction of my economic models is presented below. 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑇𝐹𝑃 = 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
+ 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑠 + 𝛼𝑖𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝛼𝑗𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜀 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑇𝐹𝑃 = 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
+ 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑠 + 𝛼𝑖𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝛼𝑗𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝜀 
 
 When creating a regression model, it is important to make sure the causality is correct in 
its construction. My economic model suggests an increase in artificial intelligence 
implementation causes a change in total factor productivity and the causality only works in one 
direction. When artificial intelligence implementation occurs, technology as a whole improves 
and there is a larger residual between total output and outputs produced by capital and labor.  
Therefore, it is expected that an increase in artificial intelligence implementation and the 
improvement of technology increases TFP. It is important to ensure that the reverse causality is 
not true. In other words, that artificial intelligence implementation is not increasing due to a rise 
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in TFP. Since TFP captures productivity due to technological progress, there is no reason to 
believe that this calculated measure of productivity causes higher levels of artificial intelligence 
implementation within one year. I can safely proceed with both my logarithmic and per capita 
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CHAPTER 5 
REGRESSIONS AND RESULTS 
 
Since the countries in my dataset are vastly different sizes, I attempt to compare them 
using two different methods. I use a per capita and logarithmic approach due to the discrepancy 
between country size, GDP, etc. A similar methodology was used by Letta and Tol (2018) for 
cross-country comparison. I present the results of both estimation methods and interpret the 
coefficients.  
 
5.1 Per-Capita Regressions and Results 
I estimate four different specifications. The dependent variable in each specification is 
RTFPNA (Real Total Factor Productivity using constant prices from national accounts data) as 
presented by the 10th version of the Penn World Tables published by the University of Groningen 
Growth and Development Center. The number of journal citations, number of conference 
citations, enrollment share (fraction of students that are enrolled in courses with Artificial 
Intelligence), total private investment in artificial intelligence, and the number of artificial 
intelligence focused startups are all recorded from the Stanford University HAI Institute. I use 
per capita estimates because it is difficult to compare countries of varying sizes and populations. 
Table 3 shows the results.  
In the first specification I regress RTFPNA on the independent variables without any fixed 
effects. The coefficients on artificial intelligence private investment and number of startups 
variables are significant at the 5% level. This indicates that countries which have higher private 
investment in artificial intelligence have slightly lower TFP. Although this specification presents 
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significance in two of my independent variables, I add the time fixed effects in my second 
specification to reduce problems of omitted variable bias. The time fixed effects remove 
variation that occurs over time and instead compares country TFP within a given year. These 
results remove some of the potential endogeneity that may occur across years. 
Once I include one-way fixed effects for year, both artificial intelligence private 
investment per capita and the number of startups per capita remain statistically significant. 
Holding all else constant, a one dollar increase in private artificial intelligence investment per 
capita is associated with a decrease in total factor productivity of 0.00143. The coefficient on the 
number of startups per capita indicates that a one unit increase in the number of startups per 
million people is associated 0.013928 increase in total factor productivity. These results are 
consistent with the previous model in which no fixed effects were used. The F-statistic for this 
specification is 8.39, yielding a p-value less than 0.01, and suggesting that time effects are 
statistically significant.  
In the third specification I include two-way fixed effects for both year and country. 
Including the two-way fixed effects in the third specification helps avoid the risk of bias that 
occurs within countries that happen to be correlated with an independent variable. Using two-
way fixed effects helps as long as the correlation comes from connections across countries, and 
not from connections across years. By including these in my model, I am able to account for 













Results of Per Capita Specification 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 rtfpna rtfpna rtfpna rtfpna 
numjournalcitationspc -55.22* -49.62 -19.19 -87.59*** 
 (30.99) (31.31) (29.99) (26.61) 
     
numconfcitationspc 36.75 20.85 2.652 36.54 
 (40.72) (42.30) (30.35) (34.33) 
     
enrollshare -0.0394 0.156 -0.188 -0.292 
 (0.161) (0.216) (0.276) (0.187) 
     
aiprivateinvestpc -0.00163** -0.00143** 0.000252 -0.00161*** 
 (0.000641) (0.000651) (0.000574) (0.000503) 
     
numstartupspc 14523.4*** 13927.6** 1922.3 23388.0*** 
 (5465.6) (5484.5) (7053.9) (4828.5) 
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE No No Yes No 
Region FE No No No Yes 
Observations 104 104 104 104 
Mean of Dep. Variable 1.010 1.010 1.010 1.010 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
   
Because the unit of observation is a country in a given year, fixed effects encompass 
factors related to total factor productivity in each country that do not vary over time. It is 
important to note that using country fixed effects means I am identifying the effect of artificial 
intelligence implementation on TFP by comparing within countries and identifying whether they 
have higher TFP in years with higher levels of artificial intelligence implementation. I am no 
longer comparing to see whether countries with more artificial intelligence have higher TFP. 
Losing the latter source of identification removes the possible omitted variable bias that occurs in 
my model but also means that I have less ability to detect the effects of artificial intelligence 
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implementation on TFP. Once I control for the fixed effects in the model of specification three, 
the effects of both private investment in artificial intelligence and the number of startups focused 
on artificial intelligence become insignificant. This indicates that neither investment in artificial 
intelligence nor increasing the number of startups has a positive effect on total factor 
productivity.  
 The fourth specification, like the third, includes two-way fixed effects. However, the 
fixed effects are for both year and region instead of year and country. In this specification, the 
coefficients on private investment in artificial intelligence and the coefficient on number of 
startups focused on artificial intelligence are both significant. A one dollar increase in private 
investment in artificial intelligence per capita decreases total factor productivity by 0.00161. The 
increase of one startup per million people is correlated with a total factor productivity increase of 
0.023388.  Also, the coefficient on the number of journal citations per capita is significant for the 
first time in any specification. A one unit increase in the number of journal citations per million 
people would decrease total factor productivity by 0.000088. 
 The two-way fixed effects model in the third and fourth specifications are the most 
important because the year and location effects help account for potential endogeneity. In the 
third specification, when both year and country fixed effects are included, the significance on all 
independent variables disappears at both 5% and 10% level. This lack of significance could be a 
result of the relatively small number of years in my dataset. With country fixed effects, we are 
looking at a given country in one year compared to the same country in the previous or following 
year. This affects my significance levels because artificial intelligence investment and TFP do 
not vary much from year to year and vary more from country to country.  
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 Another reason there may not be any significant variables in the third specification could 
be that I am seeing the effects of the productivity paradox. Although I expect there to be an 
increase in productivity when artificial intelligence implementation increases, the lack of 
significance on any independent variable indicates that there may not actually be an effect. This 
is consistent with the findings presented in previous literature as many economists and 
researchers have failed to find the influence of artificial intelligence on overall productivity. 
Again, this could be because of the small number of years in my dataset. It is common to use 
very large datasets that span over large time periods when performing analysis with TFP. 
 The fourth specification which includes fixed effects for region and year has three 
significant variables: number of journal citations, the number of startups, and total private 
investment. The significant negative coefficient on the number of journal citations per capita is 
unexpected. This could be because producing high quality research has no direct economic 
effects. Also, money put into university research is not available for other uses which might have 
more of an immediate impact and the benefits of university research will have a time lag. 
Therefore, the positive effects of high-quality research are largely spillover effects, meaning the 
research done in a given country produces an opportunity for businesses to implement findings 
into their markets. However, published research also provides the opportunity for technology 
firms in other countries to take advantage of findings that their own country has not produced. 
The spillover effects would largely be positive, because countries not doing research on artificial 
intelligence would benefit from the country that did. Also, and perhaps the more likely answer, 
academic research that is published in academic journals does not produce any products or 
investment. Therefore, the high-quality research papers that are published and cited are important 
but do not actually contribute to the productivity of a given country as a whole.  
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 The negative significant coefficient on artificial intelligence private investment per capita 
is also relatively surprising. One would think that increasing investment in technology ought to 
yield higher levels of productivity. However, this effect is not immediate and may take time for 
the investment to pay off. With panel data of four years, I am unable to see the effects of an 
investment over the long term. The initial effect may be negative because the money that is spent 
on artificial intelligence could have been spent in another industry that pays off more quickly. 
Using this dataset, we are only able to see the negative effects of the initial investment instead of 
the potential positive effects of the future investment.  
 The coefficient on the number of startups focused on artificial intelligence per capita is 
positive and significant. Unlike private investment, a startup typically has a much faster impact 
on the economy because of its role in product development. This variable measures the total 
number of startups focused on artificial intelligence that were funded in a given year. Because of 
its positive significance, it may have overcome the expected delay in productivity that we have 
seen throughout literature due to the productivity paradox.  
 
5.2 Logarithmic Regressions and Results 
Next, I discuss the results from the logarithmic functional form. I use a logarithmic 
construction for my specifications in Table 4. A log-log model determines elasticity, with a 
percentage increase in “x” causing a percentage increase/decrease in “y”. In the specifications in 
Table 4, I use a log-log structure to estimate regression equations with no fixed effects, one-way 
fixed effects for time, two-way fixed effects for both time and country, and two-way fixed 
effects for both time and region that a country is located.  
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Table 4  
 
Results of Logarithmic Specification 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 logrtfpna logrtfpna logrtfpna logrtfpna 
lognumjournalcitations -0.0268** -0.0191 -0.0223 -0.0279** 
 (0.0124) (0.0130) (0.0224) (0.0125) 
     
lognumconfcitations 0.0207* 0.00544 -0.0195 0.00342 
 (0.0107) (0.0134) (0.0145) (0.0125) 
     
logenrollshare -0.000163 0.0127 0.00336 -0.00287 
 (0.00783) (0.0112) (0.0195) (0.0108) 
     
logaiprivateinvest -0.00924* -0.00664 -0.00372 -0.00133 
 (0.00515) (0.00527) (0.00433) (0.00448) 
     
lognumstartups 0.0239*** 0.0282*** 0.0299** 0.0247*** 
 (0.00833) (0.00870) (0.0124) (0.00797) 
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE No No Yes No 
Region FE No No No Yes 
Observations 104 104 104 104 
Mean of Dep. Variable 0.00848 0.00848 0.00848 0.00848 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 In the first specification I regress the natural log of RTFPNA on the independent variables. 
Similar to the previous model with per capita estimations, the coefficients on both the number of 
journal citations and the number of artificial intelligence focused startups are significant at the 
5% level. A one percent increase in the number of journal citations is correlated with a 0.0268% 
decrease in total factor productivity. For startups focused on artificial intelligence, a one percent 
increase in the number of startups leads to a 0.0239% increase in total factor productivity. The 
estimate for startups is consistent with the results obtained from the per capita model, suggesting 
that there is a positive correlation between the number of startups in a given country and their 
total factor productivity. The coefficient on the number of journal citations, however, is newly 
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significant without fixed effects and shows that an increase in the number of journal citations 
actually decreases overall total factor productivity. Unlike the first specification in the per capita 
model, the estimate for private investment in artificial intelligence is insignificant at the 5% 
level.  
 After including the time fixed effects in the second specification, only the coefficient on 
the number of startups remained significant and became slightly larger. A one percent increase in 
the number of startups is associated with a 0.0282% increase in total factor productivity. Once 
again, the effect of this variable on total factor productivity is consistent with the first 
specification of my logarithmic model as well as the effects obtained from the per capita model.  
 Like the per capita model presented earlier, I use two-way fixed effects for year and 
country in the third specification. The two-way fixed effects model eliminates the significance of 
the number of journal citations, but the number of startups variable continues to be significant. 
The positive significance on the number of startups variable is robust and maintained throughout 
all of the logarithmic specifications. A one percent increase in the number of startups in a given 
country is associated with a 0.0299% increase in total factor productivity. Since this model has 
two-way fixed effects, this coefficient indicates that when more startups are funded in a given 
country grows from one year to the next, there is growth in overall productivity.  
 The coefficient on the number of startups is both robust and defies the productivity 
paradox. In each logarithmic specification, and in the fourth specification of the per capita 
model, the coefficient on the number of startups remains significant. This could have broader 
implications for governments and different countries around the world. Depending on the system 
of government in a given country it may be easier or more difficult to create and launch a startup. 
However, if increasing the number of startups produces higher productivity, it may be 
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advantageous to shift policy so that startup implementation is easier. The fast-acting effects that 
occur in the number of startups variable implies that this may be the best area to focus for 
countries looking to rapidly boost productivity through artificial intelligence implementation. 
 The fourth specification is less important than the third specification but nonetheless 
contains meaningful information. Using fixed effects for both region and time is useful but does 
not carry as much weight as the fixed effects for both country and time used in the third 
specification. Similar to the fourth specification in the per capita model, the fourth specification 
in the logarithmic model has both the number of journal citations and the number of startups 
significant. The negative coefficient on the number of journal citations is most likely due to the 
lack of production that occurs with research alone. Unlike opening new startups, research does 
not contribute to production of or investment in artificial intelligence. The positive coefficient on 
the number of startups variable is robust and unsurprising given my previous results. 
 Although I have found the number of startups variable to be significant, it is interesting to 
consider why the other variables may not be. Research, increased investment, and higher 
enrollment share ought to produce higher levels of productivity. The productivity paradox that 
occurs with artificial intelligence may be in action with each one of these variables. One of the 
primary concerns with the productivity paradox is a time concern. That is, increased artificial 
intelligence implementation does not increase productivity because we have not given enough 
time for it to develop to the point that we see its effects in productivity measurements. For each 
one of these variables, the time lag explanation of the productivity paradox is an appropriate 
justification for their insignificance.  
 Both the number of journal citations and the number of conference citations measure the 
quality of research that is produced by a given country. The impact of research on a given 
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country is not immediate. It takes time for research spillovers to occur and companies to 
implement new ideas into their products. Overall research and development are critical in future 
improvement of technology that will eventually increase productivity, but their delayed effects 
are not seen in my regression. With a larger dataset that includes many years’ worth of data, the 
effects of research may be more apparent. 
 Private investment in artificial intelligence follows the same trends. Private investment in 
artificial intelligence technology assists in its development but the effects of the investment may 
not be seen for years. Money that is invested today helps companies with production, research 
and development, etc., in the future and it is possible there is a lag in productivity as a result. 
Unfortunately, with a short time span in my data, I am unable to see the longer-term effects of 
artificial intelligence investment on overall productivity. In some specifications, the coefficient 
on artificial intelligence private investment may be negative because the money that is spent on 
artificial intelligence implementation could be spent in other areas that have a faster impact on 
productivity.  
 The potential delayed effects of my enrollment share variable are easily explained. The 
enrollment share variable is defined as, “the fraction of a country’s enrollments that are in 
courses teaching artificial intelligence and related skills to measure the relative interest in 
artificial intelligence content.” Since this independent variable measures interest in artificial 
intelligence for a given country through education, it is safe to infer that the skills acquired and 
learned in the courses take time to be implemented into the workplace. Once the educated 
individuals reach the workforce and begin to make an impact there should be an increase in 
overall productivity.  
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 The lack of significance presented above suggests that artificial intelligence 
implementation, for the most part, does not affect TFP in the short term. To answer the question 
of does artificial intelligence implementation affect TFP in the long term, I would need to use a 
different dataset. Research analyzing TFP growth typically has more than fifty years’ worth of 
data and my dataset only contains panel data from four years. Unfortunately, there are not many 
years’ worth of data available on artificial intelligence implementation because it is a new and 
developing industry. Although previous research on artificial intelligence uses a less 
comprehensive dataset, my research still exhibits aspects of the productivity paradox that is 
consistent with earlier findings.  
 When discussing the true cause of the productivity paradox in artificial intelligence, the 
positive significance on the number of artificial intelligence startups when using the logarithmic 
construction may offer support for the time-lag explanation. The significance defies the expected 
productivity paradox and suggests that increasing the number of startups focused on artificial 
intelligence will increase overall productivity of a country. As discussed earlier, I believe this is 
due to the fast impact a startup is able to have on an economy. It is important to note, however, 
that startups are often using technology that was developed a few years prior to the launch of the 
startup.  Following economic beliefs that technology does increase overall productivity, the 
positive significance on the number of startups variable supports these beliefs and rejects the 
notion that artificial intelligence does not actually affect overall productivity. These findings lead 
me to conclude that that the productivity paradox is largely a result of the lack of time given for 
the implementation of artificial intelligence to appear in the productivity statistics. Since a delay 
of a few months would have been captured by my variables, my results suggest that it may be 
years before there is a major effect on TFP due to artificial intelligence.  





 My research suggests that artificial intelligence implementation only contributes to the 
productivity statistics when it is tangible. In other words, we do not see productivity dividends 
from artificial intelligence when it is in the research phase and instead must wait until it is 
implemented by firms. More specifically, my analysis shows that the number of startups 
implemented by a given country has a positive effect on total factor productivity. I look at the 
effect of artificial intelligence implementation on a nation’s overall productivity by performing a 
regression analysis. I have regressed total factor productivity on various measures of investment 
in artificial intelligence.  
 Previous literature does not find that artificial intelligence implementation has any effect 
on productivity and suggests there is a productivity paradox. A productivity paradox occurs 
when technology is rapidly improving but its improvement is not reflected in the productivity 
statistics. A productivity paradox occurred during the 1980s and 1990s and some economists 
believe it is occurring again today. Justifications for this paradox are largely focused on time 
delays, measurement issues, or that there may not actually be a positive impact of technology on 
productivity. My research offers support for the time delay justification and does not find any 
effect of artificial intelligence on TFP in the short run. Although my research does not suggest an 
exact period of time before productivity results may appear, it does suggest that it is quite a few 
years rather than a few months. This explanation is consistent with economic theory presented by 
Brynjolffson, Rock, and Syverson (2017). 
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 I develop OLS models and run regressions with both one and two-way fixed effects. 
Because of the nature of my model, two-way fixed effects are necessary to account for potential 
endogeneity issues. Also, I utilize per capita estimates for my independent variables in order to 
account for the large difference in size and wealth of countries in my dataset. In addition to using 
per capita estimates, I use a logarithmic construction following the methodology set forth by 
Letta and Tol (2018).  
 The regression results from my per capita estimates for the number of startups coefficient 
was both positive and significant until the two-way fixed effects for country and time were 
included in my model. These results are consistent with the productivity paradox that has been 
found in previous research and were expected. However, the coefficient on the number of 
startups variable is significant in three out of the four specifications, including the model with 
two-way fixed effects for both year and region. Since the parameter estimates do not change 
beyond two standard deviations in the significant specifications, I can make the assumption that 
there is an effect on TFP due to the number of startups but significance in the third specification 
(two-way fixed effects for time and country) is lost because of the country dummy variables. 
This could occur because of the relatively small size of my dataset. There may not be enough 
data points to simultaneously estimate both country fixed effects and the effect of the number of 
startups and as a result enough multicollinearity is created that we do not see significant results 
in the third specification. 
 The regression results from the logarithmic estimation yielded slightly different results. 
While most of my independent variables appear to have no effect on productivity, the coefficient 
on the number of startups focused on artificial intelligence is both positive and significant. This 
result is surprising and is inconsistent with the productivity paradox found previously. Its 
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positive significance suggests that increasing the number of startups focused on artificial 
intelligence in a given country will increase that country’s overall productivity. More broadly, 
this offers some empirical evidence supporting the economic theory that improving technology 
should have a positive effect on productivity.  
 The positive and significant coefficient on my logarithmic estimation offers support for 
one explanation of the productivity paradox. The primary explanation for the productivity 
paradox is that the expected positive effects are not captured by the statistics because there has 
not been enough time since their implementation. This justification is consistent with economic 
theory and was an explanation for the Solow Productivity paradox of the 1980s and 1990s as 
well. The significance on my number of startups variable reinforces this explanation because of 
the rapid impact opening a startup has on the economy. Startups focused on artificial intelligence 
contribute to the development and implementation of new technology that immediately has an 
effect on the production of an economy. As a result, I expect the coefficient on the number of 
startups to be unaffected by the potential time lag after implementation. This hypothesis is 
supported by my results.  
The lack of significance on my other independent variables also supports the above 
justification for the productivity paradox. My other variables measure aspects of artificial 
intelligence implementation that are performed today in order to create future benefits. For these 
variables, it is expected that a time lag may prevent their effects from appearing in the 
productivity statistics. The positive significance of the number of startups variable combined 
with the lack of significance of my other dependent variables ultimately support the time lag 
justification of the productivity paradox.  
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 There are three clear potential implications of my findings. The first is regarding artificial 
intelligence investment. My research supports the time lag explanation of the productivity 
paradox and therefore countries should not be discouraged from investing in artificial 
intelligence even if the results do not appear immediately in the productivity statistics. My 
research does not suggest that artificial intelligence will pay dividends in future years, and due to 
my short time panel, I cannot address this issue, but it does offer support for the time lag 
justification of the productivity paradox. 
 The second potential implication of my research is largely focused on policy. Since the 
number of startups focused on artificial intelligence has a positive impact on productivity, it is 
advantageous for countries to create policies that encourage startup development. Policy 
adjustments based on this research would include easing restrictions on starting a business and 
possibly even supplementing the new companies with government aid. My research indicates 
that increasing the number of startups focused on artificial intelligence in a given country should 
increase productivity and ultimately benefit the country as a whole. This implication is consistent 
with my earlier conclusion that the use and adoption of technology by firms is what is most 
important.  
 The third potential implication of my research, which also centers around the time lag 
justification of the productivity paradox, is that poor countries may not be able to participate in 
the same level of artificial intelligence implementation as wealthy countries. Since it takes time 
for the investment in artificial intelligence to pay off, the reward from that investment may not 
come for many years into the future. While this may be a reasonable expectation of wealthy 
countries, poor countries may not have the time and resources to develop a technology that will 
not positively impact their economy for a number of years. It may be advantageous for those 
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countries to invest in other forms of technology that will increase their productivity immediately 
instead of artificial intelligence which appears to have a delayed impact. It is important to note 
here that positive spillover effects could occur in poor countries. If the technologically advanced 
countries develop this technology, countries that did not develop it can benefit from it once it 
becomes publicly available.  
 Although I have taken all of the necessary steps to ensure the reliability of my results, it 
is important to note that there are still some concerns regarding my conclusions. Confounding 
variables are one potential cause of concern. Confounding variables occur when there is an 
unmeasured variable that effects both my independent and dependent variable. Since artificial 
intelligence is a relatively new field, it is possible that a key variable that effects both artificial 
intelligence implementation and productivity has been left out of the equation and skewing my 
results. However, I am not aware of a way to test this for my data. The second concern has to do 
with the construction of TFP. TFP contains a wide range of factors and it is calculated instead of 
observed. Economists expect changes in TFP to be a result of technological change, but that may 
not always be the case. Letta and Tol (2018) state, “changes in TFP can also be due to 
managerial or behavioral change, changes in the structure of the economy or company entry and 
exit within sectors, changes in regulation or taxation, changes in the provision of public goods, 
changes in market power, or changes in international trade.” Ultimately, the increase in TFP I see 
from my results may not be exclusively from artificial investment and may involve a number of 
other factors. My data does not allow me to identify exactly what is affecting TFP growth.  
 The primary concern with my results and interpretations comes from my small dataset. 
When analyzing trends in TFP, economists typically use large datasets in order to capture the 
trends accurately. Unfortunately, since artificial intelligence is a relatively new field, data is not 
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available for many years. As a result of a small dataset, the number of independent variables I 
can use is restricted and the potential for measurement issues is increased. I chose the Stanford 
HAI data because I felt it was the best dataset to capture holistic artificial intelligence 
implementation rather than focusing on one particular aspect. If this data had been available for 
more than four years, I believe I would have been able to look at the long-term effects of 
artificial intelligence implementation on total factor productivity instead of only focusing on the 
short term.  
 In the future I would suggest returning to this construction with more years of data. 
Creating this unique dataset by combining Stanford HAI with the Penn World Tables provides 
insightful information about the impacts of artificial intelligence. Some economists have 
developed alternative variables to TFP to measure the impact technology has on an economy  
(Antonelli and Quartero, 2017, Bar Shira, et al, 2003, Carlaw and Lipsey, 2003). Using one of 
these alternative variables may assist in determining the specific effect of artificial intelligence 
implementation on productivity as a whole. More research will be necessary in the future to 
determine which justification for the productivity paradox is correct and when the impact of 
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